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Neither Sheep nor Peacocks: T. O. Elias
and Post-colonial International Law
C. L. LIM∗
Abstract
This article takes as its starting point the characterization of T. O. Elias as a representative of
a ‘weak’ form of anti-colonial scholarship. Elias had sought to show that the ancient African
kingdoms had participated in international legality with European states on an equal footing.
The view has arisen in contemporary scholarship that this mode of argumentation is typical
of the weak strain, evincing only a continued tendency to underestimate the imperial nature
of international law itself. A related criticism is that many Third World scholars like Elias
view international law’s claim to universality and its ability to be inclusive as relatively
unproblematic concepts. This article presents two interlocking claims. First, that while Elias
was persuaded by the idea of a universal legal order derived from European thought, he never
accepted the European view of universality. Vitoria andGrotius had paved theway for the idea
of a universal legal order, but, as Elias was consistently aware, the extension of the European
lawofnations toAfrica andAsia in thenameofuniversalitywasunaccompaniedby theoretical
recognition in European legal thought that such universality cannot be unilaterally achieved
on speciﬁc cultural terms. Second, that Elias did not view universality as an unproblematic
concept. While he considered the legal order inherited from the European law of nations
never to have been universal in its application, the post-colonial legal order could in principle
approximate more closely to an ideal of democratic universality. We focus on Elias’s attempt
to substitute the doctrinal requirement of individual, sovereign consent with majoritarian
lawmaking based on democratic theory, and his faith in the machinery of the United Nations
as a ‘technology’ which post-colonial states would employ to put democratic majoritarianism
into practice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
TaslimOlawale Elias’s discussion of the nature of African societies provides a useful
lens through which we might assess his scholarship on the evolving post-colonial
international legal order. In The Nature of African Customary Laws we are treated
to a vivid, entertaining dispute between Elias and two or perhaps three schools
of thought about the nature of African societies, and the nature of ‘the African’.1
According to one ‘extreme view’ characterized byHartland, the African ‘never seeks
to break forth’.2 The African is, in other words, a sheep according to this view, or, as
re-characterized by Elias, ‘a robot’. Yet, as Elias argued, ‘[t]he regularity and apparent
∗ Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong S.A.R., People’s Republic of China; cllim@hku.hk.
1 T. O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (1956), 92–5.
2 Ibid., citing E. S. Hartland, Primitive Law (1924), 138.
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passivity with which he observes the norms of social and political life must not
be taken as an indication that he cannot or will not do otherwise’. Another view,
which Elias attributes to Malinowski, is of the African as a ‘real peacock’, ‘nothing
if not boastful, arrogant and self-assertive’.3 But Elias also considered that ‘such a
pessimistic view of human nature stands contradicted by the realities of African
society’.4 In Elias’s view, therefore, the African and African society are ill-described
by both the ‘sheep’ and ‘peacock’ theories.
When we come to consider Elias’s views about the international legal order, we
ﬁnd that Elias considered the new African states, too, to be neither peacocks nor
sheep. They would be absorbed into what was once a European international legal
order, something which at the same time presents certain distinct challenges to be
overcome. But if a Eurocentric viewwere discarded from the outset of the inquiry, it
would become plain that the sorts of treaty practice and legal rules regulating dip-
lomatic intercourse were present even among the ancient African kingdoms. Such
African legal intercourse was sufﬁciently similar to the European law of nations. As
a result, Elias, unlike A´lvarez’s Creole world view, did not place much theoretical
importance on the distinctiveness of ‘African international law’.5 Elias did not seek
to make peacocks out of the newly decolonized African states but sought to equate
African international law practice with its European counterpart. What he sought
was parity with the European law of nations on the basis of ‘sameness’, not ‘differ-
ence’. Presumably this was due to Elias’s appreciation of the fact that the Asians
and Africans, as in the earlier case of the Amerindians, were originally considered
‘unequal’ precisely because they were considered so ‘different’.6 As such, a peacock
theory would be somewhat ill-suited to dispel the cultural superiority thesis in-
sofar as that thesis depended largely on cultural differences. However, the newly
emergent African states should not be considered sheep either, by virtue of their
inclusion (and desire to be included) within a new post-colonial international legal
order. Acceptance by the African states of the post-war international legal order was
3 The words are Elias’s own, citing B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926), 30.
4 Elias, supra note 1, at 94.
5 SeeL.Obrego´n, ‘NotedforDissent:TheInternationalLifeofAlejandroA´lvarez’, (2006)19LJIL983,at989.What
Elias sharedwith Creole consciousness was the basic need for acceptance and inclusion in the international
legal order. This juxtaposition of an absent emphasis on particularity coupled with an emphasis on the
‘sameness’ of African and European international lawpresented, as I argue below,much cause, togetherwith
Elias’s belief in the possibility of true universality, for the misunderstanding that he simply apologized for
the international legal order.
6 For the two conceptions of equality see P. Hughes, ‘Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational
Constitutional Principle’, (1999) 22Dalhousie Law Journal 5, at 38–49, andG. E.Devenish,ACommentary on the
SouthAfricanBill ofRights (1999), 43–9.For theapplicationofequalityas ‘difference’ to transnationalproblems,
celebrating locally contingent perspectives, see A. Anghie and B. S. Chimni, ‘Third-World Approaches to
International Lawand Individual Responsibility in Internal Conﬂicts’, (2003) 2Chinese Journal of International
Law 77, at 83; V. Nesiah, ‘Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of US Feminist Legal Scholarship’,
(1993) 16 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 189. In a sense, I am making no judgement here about whether
equality as difference or as sameness is the more progressive notion. While observing that the literature
tends to pay attention to local, contingent truths – in other words ‘difference’ – as progressive discourse, I
mean only to indicate that Elias does not place much emphasis on this. Having said that, it has been noted
that ‘difference’ discourse may also be regressive; see C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodiﬁed: Discourses on Life
and Law (1987), 39, which attacks the discourse of ‘difference’ in C. Gilligan’s work: C. Gilligan, In a Different
Voice: Psychological Theory andWomen’s Development (1982).
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never, and ought not to be, considered total surrender to the cultural premises of
European legal thought.
This article presents two interlocking claims. First, while Elias accepted the idea
of a universal legal order derived from European thought, he never accepted uni-
versality on European terms. Vitoria and Grotius had paved the way for the idea
of a universal legal order, but what Elias had tried to show was the existence of
universality in practice – that is, extending to the practice of theAfrican kingdoms –
without its due theoretical recognition in European legal thought.7 Second, the
lingering impression today that Elias and his generation saw universality as some-
thing unproblematic is misplaced. Such an impression confuses what Elias aspired
to – true universality both in theory and practice – with what he appreciated to be
the present state of international law. The legal order inherited from the European
law of nations is not truly universal, but it could be. For Elias, colonialism and its
after-effects could be addressed with more progressive forms of international law
doctrine resulting from greater participation by the African and Asian states in the
international law-making process.8
In this article I attempt to address Elias’s ideas and also the tensionswithin them.
I dwell on Elias’s attempt to replace the requirement of individual consent in liberal
legal doctrinewithmajoritarian law-making based ondemocratic theory, and onhis
faith in the machinery of the United Nations as a ‘technology’ which post-colonial
states could employ to put democratic majoritarianism to the practical work of
reforming that legal order. For Elias, the immediate post-colonial international legal
order was an extension of the old European legal order, but the new UN legal order
would be truly universal.
2. SOVEREIGNTY AS EMANCIPATION, THE LEGISLATIVE REFORM
THESIS, AND ELIAS’S SYNTHESIZING SCHOLARSHIP
Assuming that the European cultural superiority thesis could be dispelled, attain-
ment of sovereign statehood would complete the process of post-colonial rectiﬁc-
ation by according the capacity to make and change international law. Following
statehood, post-colonial states would preserve those aspects of the international
legal order that guaranteed their status by guaranteeing their hard-won sovereignty,
whereas the concomitant law-making and law reform powers which they pos-
sessed would enable them to repeal those doctrines that continue to repress and
subjugate.9 The link between sovereign independent personhood and law-making
power is therefore an especially important one. As Anand points out in relation
to the Asian states’ ‘having lost their personality’ during colonization, Asian states
7 Requiring a standard of civilization to bemet as a precondition tomembership of international society is not
what true, theoretical, universality is about; see, e.g., the discussion of Vitoria in G.W. Gong, The Standard of
Civilization in International Society (1984), 36–7, and H. Bull’s brief remarks on Grotius and Vitoria, ibid., at vii
(Foreword).
8 T.O. Elias,Africa and theDevelopment of International Law (1972), 46–61; T.O. Elias,NewHorizons in International
Law (1992) , 29–152.
9 Citing S. P. Sinha,NewNations and the Law of Nations (1967); J. Gathii, ‘International Law and Eurocentricity’,
(1998) 9 EJIL 184, at 190, citing S. P. Sinha,NewNations and the Law of Nations (1967).
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‘could not play an active role in the development of international law during the
most creative period in its history’.10
Thus seen, dispelling the notion of Afro-Asian cultural inferiority was critically
important. The example of east Asia, and especially the case of Japan, presents a
well-known illustration. Japan’s original aim in seeking mastery of the European
law of nations was not decolonization as such or even statehood, but status as a
‘civilization’ as understood in theWesternEuropean sense. Japan sought to establish
itself as a ‘civilized’ power by waging its own imperial campaigns in accordance
with the European laws of war. As Japan understood it, civilized warfare was the
hallmark of a civilized nation and, in this way, it eventually secured recognition
of its sovereignty.11 Thus seen, recognition was never truly considered simply to
be declaratory for countries of the non-Western world like Japan. If the Japanese
lesson was anything to go by, recognition as a civilized nation was constitutive of
internationalpersonhood.ForEliasandhisgeneration,thesituationhadnotchanged
markedly in the post-war world which they inherited; it remained important to
convince theWest that the newly independent states of Africa and Asia were equal
in cultural, historical, racial, and ethnic terms.
In practice, the Afro-Asian states, too, sought to do the same, with perhaps only a
small caveat. What they could not do to convince they could at least try to compel
throughsheervoting strength. It became important toaddresshead-on theprevalent
view that colonial peoples were entitled to self-determination only insofar as they
were prepared for it.12 This was what paragraph 3 of General Assembly Resolution
1514 of 1960 – the yearwhichwitnessed 17 new states, 16 ofwhichwereAfrican, be-
comingmembersof theUnitedNations–was about. Paragraph3 stated categorically
that ‘inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should
never serve as a pretext for delaying independence’.13 Independence had thus be-
come the only option and no conditions were to be attached as part of a process for
its attainment. The central tenet of Resolution 1514 – that colonial peoples were in
this sense immediately entitled to unconditional self-determination – constituted
‘anattempt to revise theCharter inabindingmanner’.14 Togetherwith theattempt to
10 R. P. Anand, New States and International Law (1972), 20. As we shall see, Elias believed that the extensive
law-making accompanying the post-colonial period was at least comparable, if not more extensive.
11 There is a vivid account of this in R. P. Anand, Studies in International Law and History: An Asian Perspective
(2004), 24–102. See also the short remarks in Y. Onuma, ‘Japanese International Law’ in the Prewar Period –
Perspectives on the Teaching and Research of International Law in Prewar Japan’, (1986) 29 Japanese Annual
of International Law 23, at 29.
12 Inpractice, however, the deviceused in thepost-war period to delay decolonizationwasno longer the League
of Nations’ notion of a sacred trust to ensure the gradual development of ‘such peoples’ who were ‘not yet
ready to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ (Article 22(1), League of
Nations Covenant, 28 June 1919), but themoremodern, UNCharter-based, concept of domestic jurisdiction
under Article 2(7) of the Charter. See, e.g., the arguments presented by France in relation to the FrenchNorth
African possessions ofMorocco, Tunisia, and Algeria in H. A.Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by
National LiberationMovements (1988), 63 ff.; R. Higgins,TheDevelopment of International Law through the Political
Organs of the United Nations (1963), 94–6.
13 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV)
(14 December 1960). Cf. UN Doc. A/RES/1541(XV) (15 December 1960).
14 SeeM. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (1982), 9–13 (emphasis in the original).
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construct aNew International EconomicOrder (NIEO),15 this became one of the key
examples of the use of General Assembly resolutions to emancipate the Afro-Asian
world through post-colonial law reform.
However, progress in the socio-economic ﬁeld, human rights (and particularly
economic, social, and cultural rights), reform of the principles of international
economic law, the attainment of full self-determination, and the enjoyment of sov-
ereign independence were all interconnected. What was required, therefore, was
not simply independence but an entirely new corpus of international legal norms
by which these several aspirations could be met. Sovereignty and political self-
determination would have been no more than an empty legal form if substantive
self-determination – that is, economic development – and, in the social sphere, the
anti-racist and anti-apartheid programmes were not also achieved.16 The ultimate
aimwas to become the attainment of economic and social justice.
While scholars such as Asamoah and others focused on General Assembly law-
makingasanewlaw-makinginstrument,17 otherssuchasAnand,PrakashSinha,and
Abi-Saab focused on the succession of the new states to colonial legal obligations.18
Another phase of scholarship followed, with scholars such as Bedjaoui, Hossain,
and others focusing on the reform of international economic principles.19 The
new legal principles of self-determination that emerged during the decolonization
period, as with the reform of international economic law principles, did not truly
receive full critical reﬂective attention until the late 1970s, since self-determination
was for some time, even following the adoption of the UN Charter, considered
15 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN Doc. A/RES/1803(XVII) (14 December
1962); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International EconomicOrder, UNDoc. A/RES/3201(S-VI)
(1 May 1974); Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN Doc. A/RES/3281(XXIX) (12 December
1974).
16 For Elias’s attention to these issues, see, e.g., Elias, New Horizons, supra note 8, at 170–1, 179–82, 185–249;
Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 201–20.
17 This continued, however, an already well-established interest in the subject – see F. B. Sloan, ‘The Binding
Force of a “Recommendation” of the General Assembly of the United Nations’, (1948) 25 British Yearbook
of International Law 1; D. H. N. Johnson, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United
Nations’, (1955–6)32BritishYearbookof InternationalLaw97;O.Asamoah, ‘TheLegalEffectofResolutionsinthe
GeneralAssembly’, (1964) 3Columbia Journal of Trasnational Law210; B. Sloan, ‘GeneralAssemblyResolutions
Revisited (Forty Years Later)’, (1987) 58 British Yearbook of International Law 39. Asamoah’s contribution was
to shift attention from talk of the legally binding nature of Assembly resolutions to their legal effect. He
saw the latter as a wider legal-conceptual category which subsumed narrower talk of legal bindingness
within it, whereas most (Western) scholars at the time considered the Assembly to have a very limited
role. The most progressive among those who held this limited view was perhaps Blaine Sloan, who saw
Assembly resolutions as having the propensity to ﬁll gaps in law-making authority, but no more than that,
whereas scholars working on other subjects, such as the law of territory, focused on such speciﬁc questions
as whether ‘directive’ resolutions couched in the language of a ‘recommendation’ required the obedience of
administering states, and whether such obedience can be characterized as a (mere) ‘good faith’ obligation
to follow such recommendations; R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963), 83,
and see generally 82 ff. Others, including liberal progressives such as Dugard, continued to be sceptical of
the legal bindingness or effect of Assembly resolutions; see C. J. R. Dugard, ‘The Organization of African
Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justiﬁcation for the Use of Force in the
Eradication of Colonialism’, (1967) 16 ICLQ 157, at 174–6. See also the works cited in Asamoah, ‘The Legal
Effect’, at 215–16.
18 Anand, supra note 10; S. P. Sinha, ‘Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality
of International Law’, (1965) 14 ICLQ 128; G. Abi-Saab, ‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of
International Law’, (1962) 8Howard Law Journal 95.
19 M. Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (1979), 110; K. Hossain, ‘Introduction’, in K. Hossain
and S. R. Chowdhury (eds.), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law (1984).
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to be governed by political precepts, not legal principle. Indeed, the legal right to
immediate self-determination was put into practice by the Afro-Asian lobby in the
GeneralAssemblyaheadof its scholarly justiﬁcation.20 Eliaswasat thevery forefront
of such scholarship.21 But he also stood out, with an array of complex but clear and
systematic lines of thought, as a great synthesizer.
Unlike colonial22 – and post-decolonization23 – self-determination scholarship,
Elias’s concern with synthesis placed the principle of self-determination ﬁrmly
within the wider context of the reformist agenda of the new Afro-Asian states and
the question of forming a just, universal legal order.24 Self-determination, tradition-
ally seen as a mere prelude to sovereignty, therefore came to replace sovereignty
as a central, organizing principle. This doctrinal reorientation put Elias in good,
progressive company through the creation of new, overlapping scholarly agendas.25
He was, as we shall see, particularly impressed with what Philip Jessup, Clarence
Wilfred Jenks, Wolfgang Friedmann and Richard Falk were each trying to do in the
ﬁeld.26
Elias’s ownwritings focused ﬁrst on the new forms of law-making and the applic-
abilityof the colonial legal rules in thepost-colonial era, before turning to the reform
of substantive rules and principles in furtherance of the legal right to economic and
political self-determination. He sought to weave together the different strands. For
him, the relations between these sub-ﬁelds of theory andpracticewere so intimately
related that they constituted a comprehensive strategy for the reorientation and
reform of the legal order. A concern to justify the legitimacy of General Assembly
law-making and efforts to do away with the succession of colonial legal obligations
20 H. Gross-Espiell, Special Rapporteur, Implementation of United Nations Resolutions Relating to the Right of
Peoples under Colonial and Alien Domination to Self-Determination, UNDoc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/390 and Corr. 1
and Add. 1 (22 June 1977) and UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/405 (20 June 1978); A. Cristescu, Special Rapporteur,
The Historical and Current Development of the Right to Self-Determination on the Basis of the Charter of
the United Nations and Other Instruments Adopted by United Nations Organs, with Particular Reference
to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404
(3 July1978).OneprincipaldifferencebetweenGross-Espiell andCristescu’s reportswas that the latterdidnot
consider self-determination to be a peremptorynormof general international law fromwhichnoderogation
was permitted (i.e. as a jus cogens norm); see Pomerance, supra note 14, at 110, noting this difference.
21 Elias,NewHorizons,supra note8,at165–252(thesesectionsonself-determinationandinternationaleconomic
law being closely interrelated); Elias, Africa, supra note 8, at 46–65 (the sections on the new states and on
modern international law are closely related, and should also be read with the sections inNewHorizons just
mentioned). See alsoW. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law (1977).
22 These pre-dated the emergence of a legal right to self-determination andwere thus non-legal works: see, e.g.,
A. Cobban,National Self-Determination (1945).
23 See, e.g., Pomerance, supra note 14, at 7–13; H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (1990);
Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples (1995). These were largely doctrinal works which focused
primarily on the difﬁculties posed by secession and non-colonial claims to self-determination, questions
about entitlement to non-colonial self-determination, and alternatives to independence (e.g. arrangements
for autonomy).
24 Other legalworks on colonial self-determinationwere either studies of state practice, or of related areas such
as the law on the international acquisition of territory or statehood; see, e.g., A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution
of the Right of Self-Determination – A Study of United Nations Practice (1973); M. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa
(1986); J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (1979).
25 In A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2005), at 197–8. Anghie lists Elias
with Friedmann, Jenks, Ro¨ling, Anand, Fatouros, Abi-Saab, Castaneda, McDougal, and Falk in his discussion
of scholars who saw the ‘enduring effects’ of colonialism not as a ‘peripheral concern’, but a ‘central and
inescapable issue for the discipline’.
26 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 82.
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were all part of a ‘second-level’ theoretical effort to change the rules about how new
rules were made, and to deﬁne the rules governing entry into, and participation
within, the international legal order. As for what the substantive programme for
reform would consist of, Elias emphasized self-determination as a legal right, the
pursuit of economic justice as an aspect of economic self-determination, and the
link between reform of international economic law principles and development.27
Many today say that the NIEO had failed. New doctrinal strategies continually
emerged, so thatpersistent inequalitiescontinuedto thwart the legalorder’spromise
ofuniversality.Critics suchasAnghiebegantoarguethat these imperialandcolonial
strategies had been with us for a long time. Part of the problem, they say, lies
in taking international law’s promise of inclusivity and universality too literally,
leading to a failure to observe international law’s continued use as an instrument of
subjugation.28 Drawing on Anghie’s work, Danielsen recently argued that
It may be time for a new strategy – legal pluralism without the universalist cover –
a legal pluralism that respects and facilitates the proliferation of sovereignties, of
norm-generating institutions, and of local, national, and regional experimentation
and organized resistances to ready-made ‘universals’ and ‘best practice’ governance
regimes.29
Instead of reforming the international legal order, says the critic and sceptic,
ﬁrst-generation scholarship such as Elias’s should have resisted international law’s
universal claims in theﬁrstplace. Seeking to reformthe legal order tries instead todo
toomuch and too little. The critic sees it as too little (i.e. nomore than bordering on
apology),30 while the sceptic sees it as toomuch (i.e. seeking to do the impossible).31
3. A NEW INDEPENDENT FORCE
Elias’s attempt to describe the ancient African kingdoms’ familiarity both with the
West and with international legality has been described as amounting simply to
an attempt to achieve the ‘spiritual rehabilitation’ of the African.32 Wemight, with
respect, disagreewith this assessment. To be sure, Elias did not accept the historical–
doctrinal distinction between the European and Christian states and the ‘unciv-
ilized’ Afro-Asian states, or a detached, autonomous and impartial international
legal order,33 but instead of continuing to emphasize the cultural aspects of the
problem, Elias held liberal international law directly to its promise of guaranteeing
27 See the page references to Elias’s writings, supra note 21, as well as his remarks inNewHorizons, supra note 8,
at 133 (on minority rights, stability and economic development) for Elias’s views on the links between the
permanent sovereignty doctrine, the right to development, and the rights of minority peoples.
28 D. Danielsen, ‘Book Review’, (2006) 100 AJIL 757.
29 Ibid., at 762.
30 Gathii, supra note 9, at 193.
31 Bedjaoui, supra note 19, at 110.
32 Gathii, supra note 9, at 189.
33 See further the critique of the New Stream of International Legal Scholarship in the late 1980s and during
the 1990s; M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (1989); D.
Kennedy, ‘A New Stream of International Law Scholarship’, (1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1;
the earlier, seminal work by Kennedy in D. Kennedy, ‘Theses about International Law Discourse’, (1980) 23
GermanYearbook of International Law 353;N. Purvis, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’, (1991)
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equality, independence, and autonomy to sovereign nations and peoples.34 It was
this abandonment of the cultural project for a more familiar set of concerns about
how international law is made and what the new principles of the legal order were,
which, I suspect, has led to the misplaced notion that Elias somehow did not take
the cultural project too seriously.
But Elias’s purpose was to articulate a comprehensive programme for the remak-
ing of the international legal order, and it is important to notice that while the
‘spiritual rehabilitation’ thesis was central, it was always only a part of his overall
programme. His aim of ‘spiritual rehabilitation’ – indeed, Elias’s entire interest in
having a ‘cultural project’ – was simply a ‘prelude’ to sovereignty.35 Sovereignty,
in turn, was a mere precondition for a concerted effort to reform the international
legal order. Taking liberal international legality seriously was important because
thismade the sovereign participation of the new sovereign, post-colonial nations of
Asia and Africa important.
Elias’sviewsoninternational law-making, sources theory, inter-temporal law,and
the succession of the new African states to colonial treaty obligations illustrate a
certain optimism about the potential of the newly independent Afro-Asian states to
inﬂuenceandremakethe legalorder.Thatbecametheprincipalpreoccupationinhis
writings.36 Elias emphasized the successes of the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Committee (AALCC) inhaving sought earlyon toaddress thequestionof the legality
of nuclear weapons, as well as acting as an effective grouping during a host of
other treaty conferences – the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Relations in 1961,
the 1968 and 1969 sessions of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of
Treaties in Vienna,37 and on the law of the sea, particularly in developing the idea
of the exclusive economic zone.38 In sum, the AALCC had played an important role
in directly or indirectly inﬂuencing the international law reform agenda roughly
during the period from 1960 to 1970.
Harvard Journal of International Law 81; and also I. Scobbie, ‘Towards the Elimination of International Law:
Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism’, (1990) 61 British Yearbook of International Law 339.
34 For this strategy see K. Crenshaw, ‘Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law’, (1988) Harvard Law Review 1331, at 1368; C. L. Lim, Critical Race Theory, in Tim
Murphy (ed.),Western Jurisprudence (2005), 383, at 393–5.
35 See section 6, infra.
36 It is arguably only in this regard that, conceptually speaking, Elias’s project depended also on the success of
theAfro-Asian initiative to remake the substantive rules of the international legal order, but at the same time
it might be considered that here they enjoyed greater ‘success’ than in the international economic ﬁeld. For
an excellent account of the negotiating history behind the ‘dual-regime’ which the newly decolonized states
following the Nyerere doctrine managed, with the help of Latin American delegations, to push through
during the 1978 Vienna Conference on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties, see Tai-Heng Cheng,
State Succession and Commercial Obligations (2006), 79–116. Under the dual regime, post-colonial states would
generally have the ‘clean-slate theory’ applied to them with exceptions, while non-colonial successions
would, in general, be governed differently; see Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties 1978, 1946 UNTS 3, Articles 15–30. Among the developing countries, some, such as Malaysia,
were lukewarm towards the clean-slate theory, at least in the context of the continued validity of devolution
agreements. Malaysia subsequently scaled down its original positions, but was in any case outvoted; ibid., at
94–6.
37 Where he had also served as chair of the Committee of theWhole as well as of the Afro-Asian group.
38 Interestingly, Elias also recorded the opposition of members of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Com-
mittee to the trust concept which the major powers favoured, allowing them to exploit the ocean ﬂoor as
part of the idea of the commonheritage ofmankind; see Elias,NewHorizons, supra note 8, at 29–34 and 51–2.
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Elias saw these partial successes, together with the initiative for an NIEO, as the
basis for a new body of international development law which was also interrelated
with a slew of other post-war law-making initiatives by the General Assembly and
other, lesser, UN bodies. As he put it,
The newworld order necessarily envisages clearer and bolder deﬁnitions of the rights
and duties of States as between developed and developing ones than have hitherto
been attempted or accepted in customary international law. The Declaration [on the
New International EconomicOrder] and theCharter [of Economic Rights andDuties of
States] reﬂect thenewspirit that has been abroadunderlying theUniversalDeclaration
of Human Rights and the related covenants, the Declaration on Peaceful Coexistence
and Friendly Relations, and that section of Part V of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties which declares certain treaties invalid on certain vitiating grounds –
especially those treaties that conﬂictwith a peremptory normof general international
law (jus cogens). A newworld order seems truly to be in the making.39
In any event, such predictions gave Elias no cause to reject the international
legal order. Following decolonization, the new landscape of a post-colonial inter-
national legal order appeared more clearly in tune with the aspirations of Third
World nations. ThirdWorld solidarity would provide the Afro-Asian nations with a
coherent strategy for repealing the legal remnants of the past, and he saw it as the
role, function, and responsibility of the Afro-Asian states to effect the universaliz-
ation of international law and its reformulation on an equitable plane. In addition
to this forward-looking aspect, Elias’s writings also evinced a restorative aspect. He
was equally concerned with redressing the mistakes of the past by reshaping legal
doctrine, hence his advocacy of a limited intertemporal law doctrine in relation to
the question of territorial dispositions.40 On the question of treaty succession, too,
if Elias was not wholly sympathetic to a clean-slate theory, he was at least against
automatic succession to colonial obligations. Putting asidemultilateral treaty oblig-
ations,whenitcametoaffectedthird-state rights inbilateral treaties,Elias’spreferred
solution was negotiation with such affected third states.41 But apart from such doc-
trinal reﬁnements and hopeful predictions of the future, howwas the practical aim
of concerted reform of the legal order to be achieved?
4. ‘THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF SETTING UP A NEW DEVICE’
Writing on the North–South divide in relation to the role and function of the
International Seabed Authority, Elias observed that
The whole problem . . . seems to hinge ultimately upon the setting up of a device
or mechanism which must ensure, and be seen to ensure, the holding of the scales
fairly between the understandable fears and apparently excessive precautions of the
industrialized nations on the one hand and the equally understandable fears and
apparently groundless scepticism of the developing nations. The former are afraid of
39 Ibid., at 27.
40 T. O. Elias, ‘The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law’, (1980) 75 AJIL 285.
41 See Elias,Africa, supranote 8, at 22–3, citing the approach of the francophoneAfrican states in commonwith
the Nigerian example, as against the examples of Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, and Malawi, which chose to
phase out such treaty obligations on the expiry of a grace period.
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numbers, as their experience of the United Nations and its agencies has shown that
they cannot, except in the Security Council, always have their own way . . . Most of
the latter have too recent experiences of colonization . . . And, yet, representation on
the central Council of the proposed International Sea-Bed Authority has to reﬂect the
preponderance of numbers of developing States if the Authority is to have the chance
of being acceptable to the majority of the world.42
In this regard Elias became exercised by the new theories of ‘consensus law-
making’ in a ‘tangled web of Soviet theories’ – in particular, those of Tunkin, Mor-
osov, and Yanovskii – on the question of General Assembly resolutions. Following
McWhinney,43 Elias detected – in Tunkin’s rejection of the formal law-making char-
acter of General Assembly resolutions, Yanovskii’s insistence on unanimity, and
Morosov’s need for agreement between the communist and capitalist camps and
the three main political groupings (communist, capitalist, and ‘neutralist’ or non-
aligned) – some recognition among Soviet jurists of a newly emergent doctrine of
law-making by ‘consensus’.44 In contrast, others in the socialist bloc – Pechota, for
example – viewed Assembly resolutions as representing ‘the developing juridical
conscience of people’. In other words, you cannot ignore them. Falk, like Jenks,
considered that therefore ‘the opposition of one or more sovereign States’ should
not preclude the Assembly’s emergent law-making capacity. Lachs considered that
international society had begun to acquire limited legislative authority.45
In juxtaposing the two sets of views, Elias’s own view was complex but clear.
Consensus was not to be deﬁned as the need to ensure that there was no dissent
from any quarter. In a word, consensus is not the legal doctrine of consent but
something else altogether. Call this ‘new’ view of law-making a ‘consensus’ view if
you must, but note that one would use the term ‘consensus’ in a diplomatic sense
differently from its strict legal-doctrinal sense. Elias used ‘consensus’ to mean the
insigniﬁcance of the legal doctrine of individual consent (i.e. refusal to consent, or
even outright dissent). Admittedly, he sometimes conveyed all this in a confusing
manner,46 but the distinction between the diplomatic and legal senses was clear
throughout in his writings. The new Soviet theories might well have described
whatmultilateral diplomacy by consensus decision-makingwas about in practice –
that is, the importance of non-dissent from any quarter – but, as a matter of law,
requiring individual consent as a precondition for applying anew international rule
was simply undemocratic. As Elias put it,
It would be dangerous to mix up the questions of the legal validity of [a majority vote]
with that of its desirability or wisdom in any given context; the one is an extra-legal
consideration, while the other is a matter of strict law.47
42 Ibid., at 75.
43 E. McWhinney, ‘The Changing United Nations Constitutionalism: New Areas and New Techniques for
International Law-Making’, (1967) 5 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 68, at 83.
44 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 70.
45 Ibid., at 71. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, discussing the status of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in similar terms.
46 See the entire discussion in Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 70–3.
47 Ibid., at 73.
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Onuf had correctly pointed out that, democratic or not, theWestern states would
reject such loss of power to the global South.48 But as Elias saw it, it was not legal
doctrine that precluded the new mode of General Assembly law-making. The legal
doctrine that sovereign consent to a rule solely enables the opposability of that
rule to the consenter was subscribed to by only a handful of Western states, and its
validity was therefore conﬁned only to the service of such narrow interests. Elias
observed how these ‘advocates of consent . . . are also the ﬁrst to insist that the
three-quarters of the world that took no part in its formation must be regarded as
boundby it, consent or no consent’.49 Somuch then for the importance of individual
consent as legal doctrine.
Observe, however, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declara-
tionon theGrantingof Independence toColonialCountries andPeoples, theCharter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the
Resolution onApartheid as an International Crime, as well as the two human rights
covenants of 1966, the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, and also the Genocide Convention, represented an explosion
of UN-sponsored international law-making. Importantly, they had all been adopted
democratically by being ‘preceded by several General Assembly debates . . .based on
the report or reports prepared by a study group or by one of the sub-committees set
up by the General Assembly’, before ‘their formal adoption . . . in a plenary session
by a stipulated majority’.50 As for the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, the new principles already ‘reﬂect the emergence of new concepts regarding
property and the state’s right to nationalize’, precisely because the ‘sense of the
emerging concepts, as evidenced by the series of resolutions adopted by the General
Assemblywith near unanimity of the community of states, is that property rights are
no longer absolute’.51
Ultimately, the practical setting for Elias’s theory of democratic international
law-making would be provided by the United Nations, and primarily the General
Assembly. There the large numbers of Afro-Asian states would be able to exert
themselves properly in the law-making ﬁeld – and by majority rule if necessary.
There were already several bodies, in addition to the newly emerging specialized
bodies, that were being created at the behest of the Afro-Asian lobby, which he also
saw as holding much promise in being put to the service of creating the technical
rules which were necessary to address the legal minutiae of a universalist, post-
colonial but increasingly complex regulatory legal order.52
On the side of the debate over the comparative efﬁcacy of the different modes of
international law-making,53 Elias was also a strong believer in concerted, multilat-
eral efforts at international law-making through the various treaty conferences and
48 Ibid., at 72.
49 Ibid.
50 Elias,NewHorizons, supra note 8, at 90–1.
51 Ibid., at 211 (emphasis added).
52 He was a particular fan ofWolfgang Friedmann’s writings, and especially Friedmann’s Changing Structure of
International Law (1964), which he described in historical terms as ‘epoch-making’; Elias,Africa, supra note 8,
at 82.
53 O. A. Elias and C. L. Lim, The Paradox of Consensualism in International Law (1998), 173–91.
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General Assembly law-making, as well as through the specialized agencies. This,
to him, was part of a new international legal technology.54 Compared with what he
termed the ‘somewhat sketchy character and content of international law-making
in the pre-United Nations era’ – in other words, customary law-making – the Inter-
national Law Commission, which had been established by the General Assembly
in 1974 under Article 13 of the UN Charter, now provided an opportunity for the
Afro-Asian states to participate on the basis of equality and common interest in
restating, reforming and supplanting the existing legal order. As he says in Africa
and the Development of International Law, the Commission would be composed of a
membership drawn from ‘various forms of civilizations and the principal legal sys-
tems in theworld’ – something thatwould ensure ‘the universality of the legal rules
and practices to be reﬂected in the [Commission’s] draft articles’.55 The ‘primary
purpose’ of the General Assembly’s establishment in 1947 of the International Law
Commission, pursuant to Article 13(1) of the UN Charter, was to bring
international law up to date by a process ofmodifying existing rules tomeet the needs
of thenewlyenlarged internationalcommunity. In thisway, someseriouseffort isbeing
made to take account of the expanding frontiers of international law. The keynote is
the progressive development and codiﬁcation of the subject, and in the discharge of
that task there is to be ensured the widest possible participation, which includes the
representatives of the newly independent States hitherto denied participation in the
formulation of customary international law.56
Inaddition tosuchcodiﬁcation,progressivedevelopment, andmultilateral-treaty
law-making,57 the newly independent Afro-Asian states had also placed increased
pressure on creating specialized avenues and bodies that went beyond the public
international lawﬁeld; for example, for theharmonizationanduniﬁcationofprivate
law. These new legislative methods were badly required, in any case, to meet the
needs of a technologically more advanced, increasingly interconnected regulatory
world. This was the theme ofNewHorizons, which Elias repeated elsewhere.58 How
satisfying it must have been that the African (and Asian) states could now hope to
lead theway inall thenew international law-making institutions thatwouldnowbe
required.Theideathat theyshouldreject that legalorderwouldhavebeenridiculous.
Itwas tobe, byvirtueofhaving toprovide for a fast-changingworld, a vastlydifferent
legal order anyway, and which required the institutional arrangements dominated
by the large numbers of Afro-Asian states in order even to generate a fraction of the
54 I am using the term ‘technology’ to denote an anti-positivist, anti-formalist, and pragmatic conception of
international law as a mechanism of social engineering. See further A. Anghie, ‘Colonialism and the Birth
of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations’,
(2002) 34 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 513, at 578–579 (observing that the early
twentieth-century linkage between law and institutions created ‘a formidable set of technologies’). Anghie
sees this as the eventual realization of Roscoe Pound’s and Manley Hudson’ vision of international law, see
further M. O. Hudson, ‘The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth Century’ (1925) 10 Cornell Law
Quarterly 419, at 428–436.
55 Elias,NewHorizons, supra note 8, at 384–5.
56 T. O. Elias,United Nations Charter and theWorld Court (1989), 19–20.
57 See Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 64–6.
58 Elias, supra note 56; see especially the Prefatory Introduction.
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new kinds of international rules needed.59 These new rules that were needed and
the new, more participatory legal order were joined at the hip.
Elias traced the legal – indeed, constitutional – authority for generating these
new types of norm to the Charter, not only under Article 13(1)(a), which con-
cerned the General Assembly’s role in the progressive development and codiﬁc-
ation of international law, but also taking into account Article 1(3) and Article
13(1)(b) ‘responsibilities, functions and powers’ of the General Assembly, as well
as Chapters IX and X of the Charter. In these last respects, the General Assembly
was tasked especially with legal development and law-making in the economic and
social ﬁelds.60 One example is the UN Commission for International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), a body established by the General Assembly as part of that broad
authority on its part to create new international rules beyond the public interna-
tional law ﬁeld.61 Its purpose would be to ‘further the progressive harmonization
and uniﬁcation of the law of international trade’,62 and to serve as a universal
body guided by the principle of equitable geographical distribution and having
further regard to the need to represent nations committed both to free market
principles and to central planning.63 Likewise, with the UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD),64 other ad hoc bodies such as the Committee on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States, and also the specialized agencies such as the International Labour
Organization (ILO), the UN Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UN-
ESCO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World
HealthOrganization (WHO)65 would all serve the needs of regulation and standard-
setting.
Finally, there was also the International Court of Justice. The General Assembly
in Resolution 171(II) of 14 November 1947 had tasked the Court with the role
of treating the General Assembly’s resolutions, which would of course reﬂect the
weight of Afro-Asian votes, as itself evidence of international law.66
59 As he saw it, this had to do with the ‘new frontiers’ of international law involving such ‘new branches
as international constitutional law, humanitarian law, law of the sea and of the air, international law of
communications– infact, awholenewrangeofspecializedﬁeldsrecentlybroughtwithintheever-expanding
frontiers of international law’; ibid., at 85.
60 Elias,NewHorizons, supra note 8, at 386; Elias, supra note 56, at 19.
61 Elias,NewHorizons, supra note 8, at 387.
62 UNCITRAL Statute, Article 8.
63 Elias,NewHorizons, supra note 8, 387.
64 For the Third World’s use of the Assembly to establish UNCTAD, at the expense of the UN Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) in which the Third World had less control, and the consequent enlargement of
ThirdWorld representation and inﬂuence in UNCTAD, see the ﬁrst-hand account in S. M. Finger, American
Ambassadors at the UN (1988), at 144–9. UNCTAD was the culmination of a new emphasis, starting in the
1960s, on the part of the ThirdWorld states on the role of international trade in economic development.
65 See also Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 67–8; see further the groundbreaking study in C. H. Alexandrowicz, The
Law-Making Functions of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations (1973).
66 UNDoc. A/RES/3232(XXIX) (12 November 1974) as discussed in Elias, supra note 56, at 20–1.
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5. A UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER BASED ON ‘LEGITIMACY’,
‘EFFECTIVENESS’, AND ‘DEMOCRACY’
Unsurprisingly,Elias lionizedtheUNlegalorder.Arecurringphraseofhis, attributed
to George Canning, was that the existence of theUnitedNations ‘called a newworld
into existence inorder to redress thebalanceof theold’.67 First, thepost-warUNlegal
order introduced a new set of norms and institutions, which nonetheless put them-
selves to the service of guaranteeing the sovereignty, territorial integrity, autonomy,
and self-determination of the Afro-Asian states. These principles promised to keep
the brute practice of nineteenth-century Great-Power politics in check. In the past,
the Great Powers had considered it their responsibility to transfer territories and
peoples (i.e. as proxies for potential military might through conscription) from
one sovereign to another whenever the power equilibrium was threatened. Sim-
ilar thinking was applied to the carving up of colonial territories. But the Charter
doctrines served to dishonour this Great Power practice by undermining the very
ability of the post-colonial powers to carve out territories and peoples in this way.68
Prior to the emergence of the UN legal order, the principle of self-determination
was applied selectively only to European territories and peoples, and to the Latin
American continent. Africa andAsia,with the exception of the then Siamand Japan,
continued instead to be subjected to a standard of civilizationwhich they failed, and
which enabled their continued colonial occupation.
While this tended to place great faith in the rhetorical strength of mere formal
legal principles, it undoubtedly provided the growing number of Afro-Asian states
with a coherent way of countering their own relative military, technological, and
economic weakness and their marginalization by opposing arrangements such as
the ﬁve permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council.69 On the institutional-
organizational front, theAfro-Asianstates sought to shift thebalanceof institutional
power within the United Nations from the P-5-dominated Security Council to their
own superior voting power in the UNGeneral Assembly.
To complete the Afro-Asian states’ commitment to the United Nations, Elias
exhorted them to embrace the organization’s progressive agendas in the socio-
economic ﬁeld, especially in human rights and development. To the extent that
the United Nations heralded a new institutionalized, universalized international
legality, it seemed that the Afro-Asian states were already making headway in this
regard.70 TheAfro-Asian states had an especially important function in applying the
newlaw-makingopportunitieswhich theUNframeworkprovided, and inproviding
stewardship so far as the legislative agendawas concerned. Interestingly, identifying
67 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 48.
68 See G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (1941), 125, as discussed further in H. Kleinschmidt, The Nemesis of
Power (2000), at 13.
69 See, however, C. L. Lim, ‘The Great Power Balance, the United Nations and What the Framers Intended: In
Partial Response to Hans Ko¨chler’, (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 307.
70 For an assessment of coalition activity in the General Assembly during that period see, e.g., M. J. Peterson,
The General Assembly in World Politics (1986), at 254–9 (although noting that the ‘hard use’ to which the
Third World put the General Assembly also resulted in greater disappointment). For the Assembly’s role,
and through it the ThirdWorld’s inﬂuence in establishing UNCTAD see Finger, supra note 64, at 144–9.
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the social and economic objectives of the United Nations as those of the Afro-Asian
states themselves meant that those who would argue against the role of the Afro-
Asian states were against progress. They could not see that there were by then
emerging new, necessary ways of thinking about old things, such as the manner in
which international law is made – Elias referred to this as the ‘cumulative’ aspect
of international law’s evolution. And there were also old ways of thinking about
new things, such as the adaptation of international law to new subjects – this Elias
called the ‘synthetic’ aspect.71 An assault on the role of the new states, using the new
UNmachinery, would therefore be regressive, and amount only to the old, obsolete
European law of nations.72
Yet, already, theWest had tried to reduce the principles of the NIEO to the status
of soft law.73 No amount of argument to point out that many of the principles were
or are widely accepted by the vast majority of states could prevent the powerful
Westernstates,whose interest lay inadvancingtheprinciplesofneo-liberalism, from
withholding their consent and throwing the legal quality of the NIEO into doubt.
Elias’s response was to ascribe to international society, qua society, a legislative
function based on at least three theses – international legitimacy, effectiveness, and
democracy. He cited Oscar Schachter for the view that legitimacy and effectiveness
were important facets of international legality. For Elias, four hundred years of intra-
European international law-making could not legitimately be foisted on theAfrican
states. Seeking to do so to three-quarters of the world would render international
law not only illegitimate but also ineffective. As for democracy, Elias sought to
distinguish Judge Jessup’s remarks in the South-West Africa Cases (Second Phase).74
Those who vote for a General Assembly resolution would be bound by consent
and estoppel, those who abstained would be bound by acquiescence since they
did not cast a negative vote, while ‘those that vote against the resolution should
be regarded as bound by the democratic principle that the majority view should
always prevail where the vote has been truly free and fair and the requisitemajority
has been secured’.75 The words emphasized here are especially important. This
view depended on prior legal agreement between states or, in the case of General
Assembly ‘decisions’, a two-thirds majority for important decisions under Article
18(2), and a simple majority under Article 18(3) for all other decisions.76 It puzzled
Elias that despite these ‘apparently clear provisions’, doubt and dispute could none-
theless arise about the ‘legal bindingness’ of General Assembly decisions and other
71 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 81–84.
72 ‘On the contrary, there are some traditionalists who are still opposed to any form of “contemporary” inter-
national law, who are ﬁghting a rearguard action’; Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 85.
73 Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Democratic Republic, (1978) 17 ILM 1. For an insightful study, using
the example of the Libyan oil arbitrations, of the parallel difﬁculty of arbitration law’s disciplinary bias
towards preserving the sanctity of private law arrangements allocating property rights against public law
intervention, see A. A. Shalakany, ‘Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the
Spectre of Neoliberalism’, (2000) 41Harvard International Law Journal 419.
74 [1966] ICJ Rep. 6 (Judge Jessup, Dissenting Opinion).
75 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 73. In short, majoritarianism is sufﬁcient for universal law.
76 Ibid., at 70.
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similar methods for the new forms of concerted international law-making.77 For
him, ‘legal bindingness’ would be the result of democratic legitimacy, not textual
interpretation.78
In Elias’s world view,much hinged therefore on the role of the General Assembly
as a permanent diplomatic law-making conference, and its dominance by the Afro-
Asian states in the post-colonial era. He was also Kelsenian in his view that Article
10 of the Charter meant that ‘there is hardly any international matter which the
General Assembly is not competent to discuss and on which it is not competent to
make recommendations’.79
It is worth emphasizing again that these views, which are not wholly free from
being theoretically unproblematic,80 would have had little practical effect had not
the recent technologyofUNlaw-makingaddedanewmediatingdevicebywhich the
gapsbetweenconsentandconsensualism,ormajoritarianismanduniversalitycould
be bridged in practice. Fresh devices such as the package-deal approach presented
a possible way of shading away the difference between consent and consensual-
ism, majoritarianism and universality. We do this by splitting up the contentious
issues for the purposes of facilitating trade-offs between different conﬁgurations
of majority–minority interests. In the end result, the theoretical tensions between
‘unanimous or universal consent’ and ‘majoritarian consensualism’ would be dis-
solved by the supervening technology of a democratic, parliamentary form of in-
ternational law-making – a law-making form which, moreover, had become sorely
needed to get through a full global legislative agenda if the needs of a modern
international legal order were to be met.
6. NON-REJECTIONISM, INTEGRATIONISM, AND UNIVERSALISM
Today some scholars consider that Elias’s scholarly enterprise did not go far enough
or, worse, amounts to self-deception. I am referring to Professor James Gathii’s
views, for example.81 While Elias, as we have seen, had tried to show that the
77 Ibid. Cf. BrunoSimma (ed.),TheCharter of theUnitedNations (1994), at 320, for the view that the term ‘decision’
inArticles 18(2) and18(3) refers to all types ofGeneralAssembly action. Thiswouldhave the effect of judging
all General Assembly action on democratic grounds alone if we were to apply Elias’s view to it, while at the
same time applying the votingmajorities prescribed in Article 18(2) and (3) to all forms of Assembly action.
78 Interestingly, this also represents a sharp break from the Third World–Soviet convergence of viewpoints.
The Soviet view had been stated in categorical, textual terms in relation to Article 10 of the UN Charter;
see G. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (1974), quoting from the Memorandum of the Government of the
USSR on the Procedure of Financing the Operations of the Emergency United Nations Forces in the Middle
East and the United Nations Operations in the Congo, 15March 1962.
79 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, quoting fromH. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950), at 198–9.
80 Clearly, treaty law is ﬁrmly consensual, but for the variety of theories in addition to majoritarianism in
respect of customary law formation, see Elias and Lim, supra note 53, at 29–33. Elias’s position might best
be characterized as ‘intellectualist’ and ‘majoritarian’ – i.e. majoritarian decision-making is required because
of the important international social need for a legitimate, effective, and democratic method of modern
international law-making that would account for the will of the majority of states. But for the view that
the great majority of states may not be the most powerful component in international society, see A. K.
Henrikson, ‘Global Foundations for a Diplomacy of Consensus’, in A. K. Henrikson (ed.), Negotiating World
Order (1986), 217, at 238–9. Henrikson, in effect, points to the ‘ineffectiveness’ in practice of creating a
powerful disaffected minority instead.
81 Gathii, supra note 9. Gathii’s typology has been adopted elsewhere within the Third-World Approaches to
International LawMovement, see Anghie, supra note 25, at 110.
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ancient African kingdoms experienced an international life similar to that gov-
erned by the European law of nations,82 it is now said that such ‘weak’ post-colonial
scholarship failed to appreciate international law’s fundamentally imperialist and
capitalist-materialist underpinnings.83 It seems that Eliashad simply assumed inter-
national law’spotential togenerateprogressivedoctrines.Another important strand
of criticism, which I have already discussed, is that scholars like Elias viewed inter-
nationallaw’sclaimtouniversalityanditspotentialtobeinclusiveasbeingrelatively
unproblematic.84
An important site of debate lies in andaround thedoctrineof sovereignty.Accord-
ing to this view, it was not sovereignty’s seventeenth-century roots which shaped
its contemporary signiﬁcance,85 but nineteenth-century thought’s division of the
world into civilized and uncivilized states.86 This division in historic doctrine sub-
ordinated non-European peoples to European colonial rule. The result was that
Christians and European states were vested with sovereignty, while others were
not.87 But a cultural turn was required precisely because non-European peoples did
possess the factual attributes of sovereignty, and thus someother justiﬁcationhad to
be found for their subordination. Fortuitously,non-European,non-Christianpeoples
were culturally inferior, or backward, or, simply put, ‘had no history’.88
Anghie has argued that the legal idea of sovereignty and the idea of a universal
legal order were not therefore only inﬂuenced by the colonial encounter,89 but that
these ideas are central organizing ideas for the discipline of international law.90 The
strategiesofsubordinationembeddedinthesedoctrines therefore lendthemselves to
systemic recurrence.91 Questions have therefore arisen about whether Elias and his
82 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 3–33 and 43.
83 Gathii, supra note 9, at, 189.
84 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 6, at 84.
85 Cf. C. Harding and C. L. Lim, ‘The Signiﬁcance of Westphalia: An Archaeology of the International Legal
Order’, in Harding and Lim, RenegotiatingWestphalia (1999), 1.
86 See generallyGong, supranote 7. See furtherAnand, supranote 11, at 24–102;WangTieya, ‘International Law
inChina: Historical andContemporary Perspectives’ (1991-II) 221Recueil des cours, at 195 (on the exceptional
nature of unequal treaties).
87 S.N’ZatioulaGrovogui,Sovereigns,Quasi-sovereigns andAfricans (1996), 49 and96, as discussed inGathii, supra
note 9, at 185.
88 SeeDanielsen, supranote28, at 759, discussingAnghie, supranote25, at 59, originallypublishedasA.Anghie,
‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law’, (1999) 40
Harvard Journal of International Law 1, at 28. In Anghie’s account, it was not so much race and religion that
he emphasized but culture and the ‘civilizingmission’ of theWest. Having said that, he located the strategic
movewhich shifted attention frompossession of the attributes of sovereignty to possession of the necessary
social institutions of a civilized society, such as Henry Wheaton’s view that non-European peoples lacked
legal institutions; see, e.g., Anghie, supra, at 24. Interestingly, in English legal theory this debate continued
even into the late twentieth century, with criticism of the same prejudices in H. L. A. Hart’s work; see A.
Allott, The Limits of Law (1980), 49 ff.
89 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 6.
90 Anghie, supra note 88, at 8; see also Anghie, supra note 25, at 3.
91 From seventeenth-century legal naturalist philosophy to a positivist/sovereign-centric nineteenth-century
theoryof racial, cultural, and religious supremacy; a twentieth-century inter-war conceptionof international
law and organization as a species of global administrative technology and expertise; the application through
legal ‘succession’ of exploitative international economic ‘obligations’ in the post-war, decolonization, and
immediate post-colonial eras, and the 1980s–90s era of goodgovernance reforms. See generallyAnghie, supra
note 25.
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generation ended up subscribing to a ﬂawed legal order by neglecting the centrality
of the cultural project.92
Wehave seen that, for Elias, the cultural projectwasonly aprelude to sovereignty.
Post-statehood, the Third World project ceased to be primarily cultural in nature,
and instead should focus on sources doctrine, treaty succession rules, and interna-
tional economic principles, as well as larger questions of social justice, albeit in a
manner which would allow these to remain disciplinary questions (i.e. doctrinal
questions) for international law. At worst, the charge amounts therefore to saying
only that Elias paid too much attention to doctrine. Granted, those who today may
locate the problem in nineteenth-century cultural discourse andwho view cultural
counter-discourse as central to a ThirdWorld resistance strategy, are naturally to be
discomﬁted by suchdiminution of the cultural project by Elias and others. Be that as
itmay, it would bewrong to think that, as a result, Elias somehow failed to grasp the
racist underpinnings of the international legal order, or that he somehowdismissed
international law’s racismas amere peripheral concern.What he soughtmostwas a
meaningful device for reform, and not simply the actual, historical basis for a tragic
appreciation of the legal order.93 Indeed, he assumed the contemporary order to be
tragic, but he considered that even the very material and economic underpinnings
of that order, such as the notion of absolute property rights, were capable of being
transformed.94 To succeed, however, the classic theoretical-justiﬁcatory problem of
imposing legal rules onnon-consenting (Western) stateswouldhave to claima cent-
ral place on the agenda. We have seen that a central aspect of Elias’s thinking was
that both the rules about how international law ismade and the rules about what it
meant to be able to participate in law-making were susceptible to Afro-Asian inﬂu-
ence. To the unwary, Elias’s doctrinal preoccupations in this regardmight simply be
seen to be so much uncritical acceptance of the structures of conventional, liberal
international legal discourse – but to Elias his efforts were hardly about the celebra-
tion of received doctrine, and familiar ways of talking about international law. They
92 Gathii, supranote 9, at 187–92. This is a claimwhich I have not seenAnghiemake. IndeedDanielsen’s review
of Anghie is critical of Anghie on this account: see Danielsen, supra note 28, at 761–2, arguing instead for
‘legal pluralism without the universalist cover’ as against Anghie’s continued belief in the possibility of
a universal legal order. According to Anghie and Chimni, this ‘ﬁrst generation’ scholarship was character-
ized by (i) its indictment of colonial international law for its role in the subjugation of colonial peoples;
(ii) acceptance of the view that pre-colonial Third-World nations and peoples were not strangers to relations
with European states and international law; (iii) the adoption of a ‘non-rejectionist stance’; (iv) acceptance
of the importance of the doctrines of sovereign equality and non-intervention; and (v) acceptance of the fact
that political independence is insufﬁcient for the achievement of substantive colonial liberation. SeeAnghie
and Chimni, supra note 6, at 80–2.
93 Withoutpushingtheanalysis toofar,wemightsee itasadifferencebetweenthe interestwhichthehistorical–
hermeneutic disciplines have in symbolic interactions, and the focus of critical theory on emancipatory pos-
sibilities. It is interesting to note that in the original Harbermasian scheme, it was critical theory which was
most concerned with the question of domination or power in human societies, and not the historical–
hermeneutic disciplines’ concern with the meaning of symbolic interactions. See the classiﬁcation in
J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (1971). So who has beenmore critical, Elias or his critics?
94 He never considered that law was merely part of the ‘superstructure’, but like the pioneer critical-race
scholars, he clearly consideredmaterial poverty and economic subordination to be central organizing ideas
in understanding the reality of the international legal order. Cf. A. Freeman, ‘Antidiscrimination Law from
1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization, Denial’, in D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique (1998), at 285;D. Bell, ‘Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma’,
(1980) 93Harvard Law Review 518.
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were about transforming our familiar ways of thinking and talking about interna-
tional law. Today’s charge that Elias’s ‘non-rejectionism’ amounts to ‘weakness’ was
answered with a powerful vision of international law’s authority which shifted at-
tention from the shortcomings of a positivist, unanimous consent-based legal order
to the question of majoritarianism and the demands of democratic legitimacy.95
7. CONCLUSION
Elias was not wedded to the success of a speciﬁc reform programme, such as the
NIEO and the principles for the exploitation of the seabed – although of course
he supported these. Put another way, it is unclear whether he would have thought
that these alone, if they succeeded precisely as dominant Afro-Asian opinionmight
have wished, would have completed the need for a truly inclusive, integrated, and
universal legal order. Itwas simply fortuitous that thosewhohave suffered imperial
and colonial subjugation were now in the ascendant. They would not simply be
remaking a world legal order for themselves. A new, universal legal order should
not be a partial order as before, but should be an impartial order. He saw worth in
Friedmann’s and Falk’s work in particular. Both captured the essential normative re-
quirements of a newuniversal order. In Friedmann, the functions of the discipline of
international law came into clear focus; like Jenks, he emphasized interdependence
and inter-culturalismasahingeonwhichmuchwould turn for thenewlegalorder.96
In Falk, distinguishing partiality from impartiality became especially important.97
Elias’s attraction to these views tells us something important about why he still
thought universality possible. Itwould bepossible in aworldwhichhas been totally
reconceived and decoupled from our old ways of thinking about international law.
His was a conditional acceptance of the idea of a universal legal order.
It therefore did not mean that, for Elias, the UN Charter would simply become a
‘colour-blind’world constitution.98 Theconcertedactionof theAfro-Asianandother
states, and the triumph of progressive opinion, would still be required to combat
racism and racial discrimination on an international, global level, as the concerted
action of the Afro-Asian states would be required to advance the principles of the
NIEO. Abstract, formal notions of equality and sovereigntywould not be enough, as
opposed to concerted legal reform. It was ultimately up to the Afro-Asian states to
advance economic and social justice, and it was the importance of this task which,
in turn, made it important to tailor the law-making capacity of the United Nations
to their accomplishment. In terms of the classic, although perhaps apocryphal,
legal-reformist choice between engaging in radical legal interpretative exercises
and initiating legislative reform,99 Elias was clearly a strong believer in concerted,
95 For a scathing attack on the corruption of traditional, sovereign consent-centric diplomacy by the parlia-
mentarist notions of American diplomacy see Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomacy (1954). Nicolson’s
views demonstrate just how radical Elias’s subsequent views about global parliamentarism really were.
96 Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 82. See further generally Friedmann, supra note 52 .
97 In particular R. A. Falk, ‘NewApproaches to the Study of International Law’, (1967) 61AJIL 477, which is also
cited in Elias,Africa, supra note 8, at 82.
98 Cf. Gathii, supra note 9, at 191, n. 23.
99 G. Calabresi,A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
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programmatic, policy-driven reform of the legal order, taking race into explicit
account and class and developmental differences into implicit account.100 Putting
aside its nomenclature, contemporary critical race theorywould have been nothing
new to Elias. It would also have been curious were it true that he somehow failed
to acknowledge the atrocities of which Third World sovereigns were themselves
capable. Contemporary scholars have of course emphasized this aspect. Their view
is that progressive international lawyers should lend their expertise to the various
class, gender, ethnic, indigenous, and religious-based groups who ﬁnd themselves
continually subordinated within Third World states.101 Elias himself paid close
attention to thequestionofminorities,102 andmoregenerally, toproblemsofAfrican
governance. True, the views of his generation would have been further advanced
by our own contemporary understanding of the complexity of rights,103 and by the
theoretical work of critical race theorists and global critical race feminists.104 But
I do not believe he would have found a fundamental incompatibility, as opposed
to a mere difference in inter-generational professional sensibility, between the two
projects.105
His views onmajoritarianism as a legislative device in international societymay
have beendoubted inwell-known judicial and arbitral pronouncements. InTexacov.
Libya and theAdvisoryOpinionon theLegality of the Threat orUse ofNuclearWeapons,
geopolitical spread has been considered to be of equal importance to the vote count
in assessing the legal effect of certain well-knownGeneral Assembly resolutions.106
If it were left to Elias, however, he would have counted voting strength alone, and it
seemshewouldhave counted thevotes, andparticularly theabstentions, differently.
Elias would have considered his ownwork radical in his day.What he argued for
was world government, a world legislature, and the sort of democratic rule-making
which John A. Scali, US ambassador to the United Nations in 1973–6, dubbed a
‘tyranny of the majority’. Elias considered it preferable to minority tyranny.107 The
present stateof affairs represents only an illegitimate sort of legal orderbecauseof its
antagonism towards the opinion of the vast majority of states. It is also a relatively
100 In addition to his attention to minority rights as well as to racism and racial discrimination in inter-
state relations, Elias could not but have been aware that the sort of majoritarianism which he advocated,
particularly in the economic sphere, advanced the view of three-quarters of the world but ignored the view
of 80 per cent of world trade and investment; cf. Finger, supra note 64, at 231.
101 See further M. wa Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’, (1995) 16 Michigan
Journal of International Law 113; the other works cited by Anghie and Chimni, supra note 6, at 83; and the
various essays in A. K.Wing (ed.),Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader (2000).
102 He was interested in the colonial–historical causes; see, e.g., Elias, Africa, supra note 8, at 39.The discussion
follows from his earlier work on African law; see Elias, supra note 1, at 18.
103 See J.Crawford (ed.),TheRights ofPeoples (1988).Elias, aswehaveseen,wasprimarilyconcernedwitheconomic
and social rights, particularly UN law-making and standard-setting in the economic and social ﬁelds in the
post-decolonization era.
104 SeeWing, supra note 101.
105 For the view that ‘TWAIL [ThirdWorld approaches to international law] is not new’, see D. P. Fidler, ‘Revolt
against or from within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World and the Future Direction of International
Law’, (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 29, at 32.
106 See Legality of the Threat or Use of NuclearWeapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226 (Judge Schwebel, Dissenting Opinion);
Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Democratic Republic, supra note 73.
107 This followed the vote taken on the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States; see Finger, supra note
64 , at 231.
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ineffective order in the light of the need to legislate comprehensively for a complex
range of newly emergent global economic and social issues. In such circumstances,
wherein an interconnected and increasingly complex world required detailed legal
regulation in hitherto unregulated or ill-regulated areas of international social life,
rejecting the whole legal order for being no more than a mere colonial artefact
would have sidestepped the whole issue. Instead, Elias concentrated his efforts on
the social functions that an international legal order should perform, and there was
a substantial normative element in his vision of a universalized legal order.
For a president of the International Court of Justice to have considered the in-
ternational legal order to have been illegitimate and ineffective in the absence of
majoritarian law-makingmade Elias a ﬁerce radical progressive by the standards of
his age and also ours.
